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The paper examines theoretical literature, recent EMU accession examples, and current CEECs 
performance in search of the optimal currency regime for meeting the Maastricht criteria. Currency 
board arrangements seems to provide the fastest convergence. For other regimes, the markets may 
have theoretical and historical reasons to believe in the government's temptation to devalue on the 
ERM-2  entry.  The  government  should  announce  the  final  date,  and,  possibly  indicate  the  final  
exchange rate for the regime switch to avoid excessive currency and yield volatility. It should also 
underscore the central bank’s and EU authorities importance (even if non-existent) in the parity 
setting process to avoid excessive domestic debt inflation premium ahead of the accession. Recent 
experience shows that it will be easy to get rid of the remaining influence of cross rates on CEECs 
exchange rates.  
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Introduction 
Central European countries joining the EU will have to decide at some stage when, and how to 
join the EMU. The desirability of the early EMU entry is exposed in Rostowski (2003). The question 
“how” includes, the wanted path to the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria, the strategy towards fixing 
the exchange rate, and the actual final €/local currency exchange rate.  
This  paper  considers  the  second  of  the  above  three  issues.  Apart  from  the  assessment  of 
various  exchange  rate  regimes  in  the  lead-in  to  the  ERM-2,  it  also  presents  theoretical 
considerations on the regime switch from the original, pre-EU accession to the currency band of 
ERM-2, and to the king of all pegs, the currency union. 
The article starts with showing stylised facts on CEEC performance in nominal convergence, and 
indicates  some  patterns  in  how  exchange  rate  regimes  may  influence  it.  Third  chapter  describes 
current EMU member states’ experience with accession to common currency. Chapter four shows 
theoretical arguments behind the choice of different variants of the ERM-2 on the ease of meeting the 
Maastricht criteria. Finally, the fifth part illustrates how the choice of pre-ERM-2 regime can influence 
both the nominal convergence, and the process of adopting the ERM-2. 
CEECs stylised facts 
Figures 1-4 show where individual countries stand in terms of Maastricht criteria. Also included 
are the averages for the three main currency regime groups: float/managed float, currency bands, 
and pegs/currency boards. The charts show the snapshot as of December 2002. CPI, and interest 
rate criteria are relatively straightforward to calculate1. CPI is the average annual inflation for 2002. 
Interest rates are 10-year local currency yields as of December 2002. If such instruments were not 
available, the closest alternative was used. Budget deficit and public debt was much more tricky. 
Here,  official  statistics  often  differ  from  the  ESA95  accounting.  Also,  sometimes,  ESA95 
interpretation of certain kinds of spending is not available. For example, as of December 2003 it was 
not clear if explicit subsidies to the reformed private part of the obligatory pension system should be 
deemed as a public spending or not (Poland and Hungary would lower their budget deficits by over 
1% of GDP if they were not). Still, we used official data on both budget deficit and public debt. 
Finally, one could argue that the exchange rate stability criterion was not fulfilled by any of the 
accession countries, as neither was in the ERM-2 two years before the end of 2002. However, to 
allow for some comparison of exchange rate stability, we measured it as a maximum deviation from 
“parity” in the two years between January 2001 and December 2002. It is easy to calculate for 
                                                  
1 Yet the CPI benchmark value is not. It appears that two or three new EU entrants could have the lowest inflation of 
all EU countries by 2003. We only included current EU members in the calculations.  
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countries  like  Hungary  or  Estonia,  which  had  explicit  parity  in  the  period.  For  others,  we  used 
average local currency/€ exchange rate as the parity proxy2. 
Figure 1. Floating regime Maastricht performance as of December 2002 

































Note : Log scale, thin line is EMU benchmark 
                                                  
2 Other possible measures include average from the minimum and maximum exchange rate in the 2-year period (the 
easiest to meet), and one of the extreme values (the most conservative measure).  
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Figure 2. Fixed exchange rate and currency board regime Maastricht performance as of December 2002 










































Source: ING, EcoWin, IFS  
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Figure 3. Exchange rate bands and heavily managed floats: Maastricht performance as of December 2002 

































Figure 4. Average Maastricht performance for counties grouped by exchange rate regime 
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While each country is different, striking similarities can still be observed. All floating exchange 
rate countries suffer from budget problems. In fact, it is almost the only criterion not fulfilled for the 
floaters (Slovakia’s CPI was just marginally above the benchmark in December 2002). Peggers 
were the best overall, by far, with Estonia and Bulgaria slightly above the mark with inflation, but 
overall well within the benchmark on all five criteria. Finally, Hungary, Slovenia and Romania, all 
with heavily managed, but not pegged exchange rates fared worst, having problems with both CPI 
and the budget. 
Romania’s  performance,  in  terms  of  inflation,  foreign  exchange  stability  and  interest  rates 
remain the worst of all, Hungary had the biggest budget deficit, and Bulgaria highest public debt. 
EMU members 
In  1998  European  Commission  recommended  adoption  of  the  single  currency  by  Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland 
on 1 January 1999. Named countries according to the Convergence Report 1998, achieved a high 
degree of sustainable convergence. Greece joined the EMU two years later.  
Can the short history of the EMU help us to understand the process of the new enlargement, 
which  will  include  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  economies?  Bearing  in  mind  fundamental 
differences in development, integration, and access to capital between the CEECs and the core EU 
Members of the 1990s, we will continue with comparisons mainly with so called Club Med countries 
Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy, the first three joining the EU only in the 80’s and the last one 
facing nominal convergence problems. These countries are also much more comparable with some 
of current candidates with respect to the level of real convergence with EU member states.  
Prior  to  looking  at  the  similarities  first  the  differences  must  be  stressed.  One  is  the  period 
between the EU accession, ERM-2, and EMU entry. This is an important factor for two reasons. 
First, nominal and real convergence had more time to work, than for the fast-track EMU applicants 
among the CEECs. This concerned not only overall economic integration, and adjustment of relative 
and absolute prices to the EU levels (which did start prior to the EU accession for the CEECs), but 
also adjustment of interest rates, and establishment of the (almost final) exchange rate parity. Club 
Med countries (except for Greece) spend considerable time in the ERM/EMS system which could 
have increased their currencies stability by the end of the ERM-2 period, despite initial speculative 
attacks and pegs realignments in mid 90’s. 
Inflation 
Convergence Report 1998 envisages the reference value for the inflation criterion at 2.7 for the 
YoY HICP index in January 1998. The reference value was established on the basis of the average 
of the three best performing countries (Austria, France and Ireland) plus 1.5pp. All EU member 
states but Greece met the criterion. As shown in Figure 5 below, in case of Club Med countries, 
inflation in fact reached its bottom at the time of the convergence assessment, to reverse to higher  
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levels  afterwards.  The  explanations  of  the  latter  inflation  pickup  are  being  ascribed  to  Harrod- 
Balassa-  Samuelson  (HBS)  effect  as  well  as  price  level  adjustments.  The  latter  implies  higher 
inflation in the countries with relatively lower price levels as a catching up effect. Named here should 
also be consumption growth in the aftermath of rapid interest rates falls, especially the long term 
ones.  
By 2002-2003, the situation of majority of the ten candidate countries looks to be better than of 
the Club Med countries three years ahead of the EMU entry. Most of the CEECs already dealt with 
high inflation problems either through inflation targeting, or using rigid currency pegs. 
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Source: Datastream 
Exchange rates stability 
Fixed  exchange  rate  regimes  under  the  EMS  (European  Monetary  System)  were  a  part  of 
stabilization  policy  and  succeeded  in  bringing  down  the  inflation  rate,  notwithstanding  the  EMS 
collapse in 1992. Importantly all participating countries had long experience with rigid exchange rate 
regimes. Following various exchange rate targeting regimes of the last 15 years of 20
th century, the 
parity setting might have been seen as less problematic than it may be for the new entrants. 
The  post  EMS  ERM-2  system  was  not  really  tested  for  the  Club-Med  countries,  and  the 
exchange rates slowly converged to the final parity. The process was much faster for Portugal, than 
it was for Spain, even though the path of the final bond spread compression proceeded almost 
exactly together. In both cases, the currency was trading stronger than the final parity.  
One  exception  has  been  Greece,  the  experience  of  which  may  remind  the  situation  of  the 
floating  CEECs  the  most.  Before  entering  ERM-2  Greece’s  authorities  decided  to  devalue  its 
currency by some 13%, which, as one could expect, was followed by appreciating pressure. The act 
of parity devaluation serves as a proof of the appropriateness of Froot and Rogoff’s (1991) idea of 
strong government’s temptation to inflate away its fiscal problems at the entry to the ERM-2. As 
during  the  next  two  years  the  drachma  was  at  the  strong  part  of  30%  band,  the  parity  was 
renegotiated (see Figure 6).   
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Speculative attacks, troubling the EMS system in early 1990s, do not seem be very dangerous 
for the new ERM-2 members. The size and limited deepness of the candidate countries’ financial 
markets  put  them  in  a  favourable  position.  The  threat  of  speculative  attacks  can  be  efficiently 
eliminated if ECB will be prepared to intensively facilitate the adherence to the assumed target band 
for given currency. It can prove to be the case especially for small open economies of Estonia and 
Lithuania  with  currency  board  agreements  in  operation  for  sufficiently  long  time  to  prove  the 
appropriateness of the parity. 
Figure 6. Exchange rate for Greece 
Source: DataStream 
It is worth reminding that Finland and Italy spent less time in ERM-2 (16-19 months) when the 
qualifying decision was made. 
Interest rates 
The experience of the current EMU members shows that the long term interest criterion is met 
as soon as market starts believing in accession. Robertson (2003) writes: 
It was felt that the markets would never trade long-bonds of Italy, Spain or Portugal close 
to the levels of Germany, so even if they cut their public debt ratios like Belgium did, they 
could  still  be  excluded.  But  the  markets  decided  otherwise.  They  recognised  that  the 
technocrats had had to fudge one criterion [public debt], so the EU may fudge them all. In 
which case, it made sense to bet that all countries with high debt ratios would join the 
Euro. The markets were right.  
The responsiveness of the bond yields to the EMU entry expectations may cause problems too. 
Long term yields may as well quickly rise if only expected EMU entry date is put at doubt. Recent 
experience with Polish and Hungarian spreads widening by 200bp in June-November 2003 in face 
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Figure 7. Ten-year bonds spreads over Bunds (in percentage points) 
Source: DataStream 
Public debt and budget deficit 
The application of the criteria to the current EMU states introduces much uncertainty for the 
newcomers. It showed that as much as it is up to the political will of the government to meet the 
fiscal criterion on budget deficit it is also, to a big extent, a political will of the European authorities to 
assess the country as adhering to fiscal scrutiny. As shown in the graphs below in case of many 
current  EMU  countries  explicate  quantitative  criteria  were  violated  at  the  time  of  convergence 
assessment. However, except for Greece all of them were considered as not running excessive 
deficits. 
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Source: EU Commission, Convergence report 1998 
The formulation of the criteria on fiscal policy leaves much room for discretionary judgments 
about such issues as whether the deficit has declined "substantially and continuously," what level is 
"close" to three per cent, and what constitutes an "exceptional and temporary" excess.3  
1998  Convergence  Report  provides  some  general  conclusions  on  the  adherence  to  such 
ambiguous criteria. First it defines successful budgetary retrenchments as those that reduce the 
deficit mainly by cutting current primary expenditure, while non-lasting adjustments tend to rely more 
on tax increases or cuts in capital spending. The composition of the adjustments that took place in 
most EMU member states involved important reductions in primary current government expenditure. 
This indicated that they were generally soundly based and therefore likely to be maintained in the 
future. Second, the excessive deficit procedure examines actual and planned deficits. Third, the 
procedure accounts whether the government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure. 
                                                  
3 Compliance with budgetary discipline is examined by the Commission on the basis of the following two criteria:  
(a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value 
[specified in the protocol as 3 %], unless: 
— either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the reference value; 
— or, alternatively, the excess of the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the 
reference value; 
(b) whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value [specified in the protocol as 
60 %], unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace’ 
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Options for the ERM-2 and Maastricht criteria 
Inflation 
In theory, in the latter stage of transition, floating exchange rate makes fulfilling the inflation 
criterion easier. Fast growing CEECs are prone to the HBS effect. Higher productivity growth in 
tradables puts wage and relative price pressure on non-tradables where productivity does not grow 
as fast. Assuming price elasticity of demand for tradables and non-tradables to be the same, higher 
productivity growth in tradables could strengthen the local currency, stimulating tradables’ price falls, 
which could offset the non-tradable price hikes. 
Second  channel,  working  in  a  similar  fashion  is  the  decreasing  cost  of  capital,  likely  to  be 
observed in the intermediate and latter stages of transition. Assuming the tradable sector is more 
capital intensive, falls in capital costs will increase the marginal return on labour more in that sector. 
This, in turn implies growth of wages and prices in the non-tradable sector, and consequently real 
exchange rate will also have to appreciate (Buiter and Grafe, 2002). 
The third, mentioned in Rostowski (2003), is the demand channel – higher growth of demand for 
non-tradables in fast growing economies put wage and price pressure on that sector, and on real 
exchanger rate to appreciate (provided productivity in non-tradables does not grow too fast). 
The impact of all the effects equalising relative prices in the CEECs and the old Member States 
is 3.5-4% per year, according to Pelkmanns et al. (2000), and this, potentially is the CPI gain of 
having the exchange rate able to appreciate in nominal terms. From this point of view, the classic 
ERM-2, with ±15% band is the best, provided the initial market rate is close to the parity rate. For a 
two-year period between setting the parity and evaluating the Maastricht criteria, 15% should be 
more than enough, while the strict, “Solbes version”, with a ±2.25% band may not leave enough 
room to fulfil the criterion. Keeping in mind the possibility to revalue the parity, without violating the 
exchange rate stability criterion, any non-currency board version of the ERM-2 is likely to be better 
in tackling the problem of growth-related real exchange rate appreciation. The cost of altering the 
currency board rate makes such changes less likely.  
An issue related to timing of the CPI benefits is worth mentioning. Because the benchmark of 
expected EMU parity remains in the centre of the ERM-2 bands (Ireland and Greece did have their 
exchange rate revalue, but other catching-up countries did not), rational economic agents should set 
their prices and wage demands to take into account at least the final year depreciation of the local 
currency  (if  it  does  stay  below  the  ERM-2  parity).  This  could  limit,  or  completely  eliminate  the 
beneficial  effect  of  semi-floating  exchange  rate  on  inflation.  Drachma  and  escudo  started  to 
depreciate back towards the parity some one year and 8 months ahead of the EMU entry, while in 
Spain,  the  process  started  three  years  ahead  of  EMU.  If  “convergence  check”  comes  some  8 
months ahead of the EMU, and exchange rate pass-through is significant for periods less than 1 
year, inflation effect of the ±15% ERM-2 could actually work in the opposite direction than the one 
described in the previous paragraphs.  
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Also  on  the  negative  side,  non-fixed  exchange  rate  regimes  may  be  promoting  short-term 
volatility  in  case  of  global  (or  regional)  market  disturbances.  Habib  (2002),  and  Csermely  and 
Vonnak (2002) show that world emerging markets’ contagion does significantly influence exchange 
rates of Poland and Czech Republic (and Hungary, with a currency band regime). This means that 
major  world  market  shock  could  prompt  depreciation  leading  to  subsequent  problems  with  CPI 
criterion.  In  the  final  stages  of  the  EU  accession  the  argument  already  becomes  less  valid  for 
emerging market problems, but more so for converging markets. As the date of the likely EMU entry 
approaches,  Hungarian  forint  will  be  less  prone  to  Latin  American  or  Russian  crises,  but  more 
susceptible to, say, fiscal disturbances in Czech Republic. This is exactly what happened by the end 
of 2003, when concerns over Polish fiscal policy prompted another wave of Hungarian forint selling, 
and another bout of bond spread disconvergence. Such events thus could, theoretically cause some 
inflation-related problems, unjustified by local policies or fundamentals.  
Major  capital  outflow,  however,  is  unlikely  to  cause  CPI  problems  for  either  exchange  rate 
regime, provided it fails to topple the exchange rate arrangement. First, for fixed exchange rate 
regimes and narrow band, the effect of capital outflow can be contractionary. The negative CPI 
impact for wide bands will only appear under extremely precise timing. It would have to happen 
about one year ahead of the Maastricht check, and even then, the inflationary impact could quickly 
be reversed if the belief in the parity returns (as it should). 
Another  exchange  rate  regime-related  inflation  issue  comes  to  play  if  exchange  rate  band 
becomes binding. Capital inflow (appearing e.g. as a result of insufficient savings in economies 
expecting faster growth in the post EMU years) being absorbed by the central bank with higher base 
money can become a problem either for inflation, or for the budget, through costs of sterilisation. 
Provided the parity is not set much weaker than the market rate, the problem is going to be much 
more pronounced for the ±2.25% ERM variant, or for the currency boards. The ±15% band is able to 
emulate the float much easier in that respect4. 
Disentangling  the  impact  of  the  ERM-2  arrangement  on  inflation  is  thus  quite  difficult.  The 
standard,  relative  price  adjustment  argument  for  the  floating  exchange  rates  cannot  be  easily 
translated  into  the  superiority  of  ±15%  ERM-2  band  over  the  narrower  arrangements,  currency 
boards, and unilateral euroisation. This it due to the fact that nominal appreciation can be expected 
to be reversed in the final stages of EMU accession. One problem which wide band is likely to have 
on a smaller scale, is the monetary expansion appearing when the exchange rate hits the bottom of 
the band. Here, pegs, currency boards, and narrow bands are inferior, provided the initial parity of 
the ±15% band is not set too weak relative to the market rate. 
                                                  
4 Delgado and Dumas (1992) show that for trended fundamentals (like trend money demand increase related to 
relative price adjustments) widening the currency band widens the bounds on fundamentals (the intervention limits) by 
three orders of magnitude. For mean reverting fundamentals the result holds only if the band is centered on the mean 
reversion point.  
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Interest rates 
The success in fulfilling the interest rate criterion depends largely on the credibility of the EMU 
accession, i.e., on the ability (or willingness) to fulfil all other criteria. If the markets believe the 
country will be considered fit to join the EMU, they will make sure the bond yields adjust roughly to 
the EMU levels. Public debt levels, bond supply, fiscal stance; the effect of all these on the bunds – 
other EMU member bonds’ spreads is very limited (within 30bp, judging by current EMU members’ 
bond spreads vs bunds). What is more, while inflation inertia is a significant factor to bear in mind 
while preparing to join the EMU, bond yields can be extremely quick to adjust – almost jumping into 
the new, low yield equilibrium at the moment of the ERM-2 entry. This makes the choice of both the 
pre-ERM-2  exchange  rate  regime  and  of  the  actual  variant  of  the  ERM-2  regime  somewhat 
irrelevant for the ability to fulfil the interest rate criterion at the time of the EMU entry decision. 
The theory suggests that the floating exchange rate allows nominal appreciation (through HBS 
effect, savings-investment imbalance created by expectations of higher growth, and stimulated by 
opening and deepening of the CEECs financial markets). This would suggest, through uncovered 
interest parity (UIP), lower bond yields than in the more rigid exchange rate set-up, where real 
appreciation translates into higher inflation pressures. But as shown above, inflation and bond yields 
in the ±15% ERM-2 band may not benefit from the nominal appreciation pressures. That is because 
these are likely to be reversed back towards parity in the final 1-2 years of ERM-2 anyway. A 5% 
nominal depreciation expected in one year would then translate into 120bp higher spread on 5-year 
bonds. Because there is a non-zero probability that parity would be revalued, the negative impact of 
the final year depreciation expectations could be somewhat limited.  
What is more, the wide-band ERM-2, different from the float from the mean expected value 
point of view, can be almost equivalent to the float on the risk front. This could be additionally 
boosting the bond spreads. Short-term currency premium, bound to be higher than in the case of a 
credible peg or currency board, may have an important effect on especially the short-end of the 
yield curve. 
Should thus the currency board ERM-2 result in unconditionally lower yields than a narrow-band 
ERM-2, which, in turn, has lower yields than the ±15% arrangement? Not necessarily – capital 
inflow-related inflation problems in the more rigid versions of ERM-2 could make the whole process 
of accession doubtful, putting additional spread burden on such countries. The overall impact of the 
exchange  rate  regime  on  bond  yields  is  therefore  unclear,  and  depends  on  where  the  market 
exchange rate is, relative to the likely parity (for both versions of the band-ERM-2, especially the +/-
15% variant), and on the CPI performance in the year prior to the Maastricht criterion check. 
Exchange rate stability and the EMU parity 
There are three issues related to exchange rate in the run-up to the EMU. First, is the exchange 
rate stability criterion itself, and the impact of the choice of exchange rate regime on the ability to 
fulfil it. Second is the desired exchange rate. The third is the switch from the ERM-2 regime towards 
the final fixing.  
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Several points need stressing before we engage in comparison of exchange rate regime. First, 
the ERM-2 is not symmetrical. Revaluations of the band are permissible, meaning, that successful 
speculative attack against the € does not have to breach the criterion. Such attacks could succeed if 
the defence of the stronger edge of the band were to significantly threaten the CPI criterion. 
Secondly, ERM-2 is not an exchange rate regime of a single country. It is a matter of common 
concern – the CEECs will not be alone in both setting of the parity, and in the defence of the bands. 
It is easier to start with the evaluation of the exchange rate stability criterion for the pegged 
regimes. The literature on the subject is vast, starting with Krugman (1979) classic, later simplified 
and extended by Flood and Garber (1984) and surveyed in Agenor et al. (1992). So called first 
generation crisis models base on exhaustible resource literature originating in Hotelling (1931). The 
first generation crisis occurs as a result of an unreformable macroeconomic policy incompatible with 
fixed  exchange  rate.  In  Krugman’s  example  the  policy  is  the  one  of  excessive  fiscal  deficits, 
monetised away. Incompatible macroeconomic policy causes gradual depletion of reserves. Fixed 
exchange  regime  can  last  only  until  foreign  exchange  reserves  reach  certain  critical  level.  The 
model predicts, however, that the end comes earlier than that. Rationally thinking speculators attack 
and buy all remaining stock of reserves as soon as the shadow price – the price which would prevail 
without central bank fixing the exchange rate reaches the official rate. The regime turns smoothly to 
a float (exchange rate does not jump, only the level of reserves). 
Krugman and Rotemberg (1992) provide a model of imperfectly credible exchange rate bands. It 
joins two strands of the exchange rate literature – target zones models and currency crisis models5. 
The model goes as follows (where s is log exchange rate, m is log money supply, d is domestic 












E g v m s , where a change in v is a shock to the money demand following random walk 
with a drift: 
z t v ¶ + ¶ = ¶ s m  
Log money supply m = ln(d + r) 
Under the free floating regime, expected depreciation is equal to the drift in the money demand. 
Holding money supply constant, the general solution of the model, is6: 
v v Be Ae v m s
2 1 + + + + =
a a gm , where A and B are free parameters, and 
With the exchange rate fully floating, money supply is truly constant and cannot be expected to 
change, thus the expectations component is simply equal to the expected change in v – the drift. In 
                                                  
5 Other models of this kind can be found in, e.g. Bertola and Svensson (1993). Flood and Garber (1992) extend the 
model to allow for discrete interventions. 
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such case both A and B are equal to zero (if we exclude the possibility of speculative bubbles). If, 
however, the central bank is expected to spend the reserves, defending some target exchange rate, 
then rational speculators expect money supply to fall as soon as exchange rate reaches the edge of 
the band. The size of A and B depends on the amount that the government is willing to spend 
defending the edges, the size of the reserves in the case of A, and the amount of reserves the 
central bank will buy in case of an “attack” on the stronger side of the band (which determines B). It 
is relatively straightforward to determine the value of A, knowing the level of the foreign exchange 
reserves, and that no predictable discreet jumps in exchange rate can happen. 
After the speculative attack, when reserves r are exhausted, money supply m falls to d, and the 
regime is floating, thus the shadow exchange rate is: 
š = d + v +γµ 
For small level of reserves (reserve/domestic credit ratio  ),  the  attack  occurs,  as 
before, when shadow exchange rate is equal to the regime exchange rate. This is the only rate that 
eliminates the possibility of capital gains for the speculators. The attack happens when v reaches 
the critical level v’ (for which š is equal to the targeted level of the exchange rate smax): 
v Ae v m v d
1 + + + = + +
a gm gm ' '  
A, which ensures the no-exchange rate jump is equal to: 
( ) r e
d s 2 - - -
a gm max . 
Figure 9. Target exchange rate with limited reserves 
 
Figure 9 shows exchange-rate-money demand shock loci for the free-float (dashed line) and 
zero-reserves  (post  attack)  float  (solid  straight  line,  parallel  to  the  free  float).  The  latter  can  be 
considered  a  shadow  exchange  rate.  It  becomes  the  actual  exchange  rate  at  a  point  where  it 
crosses  the  curved  line  (target  regime).  While  it  is  obvious  that  the  zero-reserves  curve  shows 
stronger exchange rate than the (no-attack) free-float (total money supply is lower by the amount of 
reserves, so the exchange rate must be relatively stronger after the attack), the fact that the target 
regime  curve  is  below  the  free  float  is  more  exciting.  It  shows  that  despite  inability  of  the 
government  to  defend  the  target  rate  (as  soon  as  v  reaches  v’  the  regime  collapses  and  the 
exchange rate starts to follow the zero-reserves curve), the exchange rate is supported by the sheer 
willingness of the authorities to spend reserves defending the target (Krugman’s honeymoon effect). 
The kinked thick curve (X-Y-Z) is the actual exchange rate-money demand schedule. 
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The situation looks different when reserves to domestic credit ratio is bigger. For large reserves, 
the regime curve reaches its maximum to the left of the post-attack locus. The speculative attack 
does not then take place at all, and the target can be kept with very small interventions. Situation 
like that is shown in Figure 10. A is set to make the regime locus tangent to the exchange rate target 
(s cannot be expected to grow above the smax without the attack). Each intervention, however shifts 
the regime locus to the right, as the reserves get smaller and smaller. When the reserves reach 





R ),  i.e.  when  the  maximum  of  the  regime  locus  is  at  the  (smax,v’)  point, 
speculative attack occurs consuming all remaining reserves, and the regime turns into free float. 
Figure 10. Target exchange rate with large reserves 
The  important  point  from  this  analysis  is  that  the  attack  cannot  occur  for  sufficiently  large 
reserves. If the initial reserves are much larger then domestic credit, reserve loss is zero when 
fundamentals are good enough (v is low). As v gets worse, the reserves start to dribble out (along 
the horizontal part of the bold curve in Figure 10 As they keep worsening, the attack occurs at some 
stage  (the  drift  in  the  money  demand  shock  term  ensures  that  in  the  original  model),  which 
eliminates all the remaining reserves.  
When  the  reserves  are  initially  small,  they  do  not  contribute  much  to  the  defence  of  the 
exchange rate target. All the reserves are suddenly wiped out when the fundamentals v worsen 
beyond some threshold. The only benefit from the reserves is the some support to the currency for 
moderate levels of fundamentals, before the attack. 
We would argue that the first-generation model with monetised budget deficits is most unlikely 
to have any use for the CEECs. Because deficit monetisation is not allowed in the EU, such risk for 
any  ERM-2  members  is  non-existent  (currency-boards  are  protected  from  such  behaviour  by 
definition). Also,  as  shown  above,  it  is  the  fundamental  real  strengthening  trend  with which  the 
countries will have to cope. Thus, for fixed exchange rates the reserves will not dribble out, but 
dribble  (or  rush)  in.  Still,  the  framework  used  for  currency  band  models  can  be  used  to 
accommodate almost any drivers of exchange rate. 
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Second  generation models  (a good  example  is  shown  in  Obstfeld  1994)  addressed  serious 
drawbacks of the first generation models7. First, the governments and central banks in the models 
built  on  Krugman  (1979)  were  like  lemmings:  once  engaged  in  a  policy  incompatible  with  fixed 
exchange rates, they were heading for the disaster of reserve depletion. In reality, the governments 
have  more  options:  for  example,  they  can  change  their  policy  when  balance  of  payments  gets 
worse,  or devalue  without  depleting  the  reserves  first.  The  second-generation  models  allow  the 
governments to optimise. The loss function usually includes the exchange rate and some variable 
dependent on both actual depreciation and the prior public expectations of depreciation. In two 
models  presented  in  Obstfeld  (1994),  the  variable  is  a  level  of  taxation  (dependent  on  nominal 
interest  rates,  and  thus  on  public  expectations  of  nominal  depreciation),  or  unemployment 
(dependent on agents’ wage setting decisions, and thus nominal depreciation). 
The circular causality indicated above gives rise to fascinating properties of second-generation 
models. Exchange rate regimes that at first glance may seem to be perfectly viable may suddenly 
collapse simply because they are expected to. The possibility of multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling 
attacks fits very well with crises like 1992 EMS collapse. Important feature of most of the second-
generation models is that self-fulfilling attacks cannot occur for any value of fundamentals. Usually, 
there is a range of fundamentals for which an attack is impossible, a range for which the attack is 
certain, and a range in which both “attack” and “calm” equilibria are possible. 
This  class  of  models  appears  much  more  likely  to  trouble  the  ERM-2  members,  not  least 
because it seems to describe well what has happened in the 1992. What would cause such a forced 
departure from the peg? Very high unemployment could cause the markets believe it would be 
cheaper politically to give up exchange rate stability (and prompt EMU entry) for a depreciation. For 
a  politically  feeble  government,  substituting  difficult  structural  reforms  for  a  quick  fix  of  major 
depreciation could appear tempting, especially if they were not expected to be in the office to reap 
the political glory of EMU entry. Even though the political cost of abandoning the peg (especially for 
the currency board) may be much higher than for (fresh) ERM-2 system, the flexibility of the latter 
(its wide-band variant at least) provides for some scope for foreign exchange stimulation without 
breaching the system8. 
New  models  also  appeared,  exploring  asymmetric  information  issues  (when  implied 
government’s  bail-out  promise  distorts  investment  decisions  leading  to  contingent  government 
liabilities either becoming actual fiscal spending or killing the banking sector through a wave of 
insolvencies, see e.g. Corsetti et al., 1999), or liquidity crises (building on bank run literature, and 
maturity mismatch in capital account-surplus countries, see e.g. Rodrik and Velasco, 1999). Such 
problems could trouble the CEECs regardless of the exchange rate regime, especially if the process 
of  excessive  private  foreign  borrowing  (on  the  investors’  insurance  presumption),  and  failed 
                                                  
7 For other models of this kind see e.g. Obstfeld (1996), Velasco (1996) Ozkan, Gulcin, and Sutherland (1998), 
Drazen (1999). A survey is provided in Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) 
8 But then, a currency board failed by 15% depreciation could still be accepted.  
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investments start significantly before the ERM-2 entry. Then, the cumulated crisis hang-up could be 
large enough to topple not only the currency peg, but also any kind of ERM-2 band. 
Similar logic can be applied to the liquidity issues – once the foreign debt builds up, the sudden 
financing stop could cause severe crisis, due to costly liquidation of investments. 
The  models  described  above  can  usually  be  applied  to  both  fixed  and  band  exchange  rate 
arrangements. The CEECs are unlikely to engage in reckless money printing, which could lead to the 
first-generation type crisis, and fundamentals are likely to put pressure on the stronger edge of the 
band  (and  currency  board  is  protected,  additionally,  by  high  reserves,  and  automatic  monetary 
tightening in case of a speculative pressure). More problematic is the case of policymakers willing to 
devalue (and abandon ERM-2) to jumpstart ailing economy at the expense of early EMU adoption. 
Incentives created by the EC/ECB/incumbent EMU members may influence the loss function of the 
CEECs policymakers. Outright opposition to their EMU entry will increase the temptation to sacrifice 
EMU entry in favour of stimulating the economies. The hint of such a thing happening could increase 
market pressure and prompt the failure of the ERM-2. Even though the costs of confidence loss could 
be higher for the currency board than for the band (it translates more quickly into monetary tightening 
than in the case of a currency band), the risk of the failure to meet ERM-2 criteria does not need to be 
higher. Credibility would suffer more, and the economy would gain less (if at all) from the collapse of 
the currency board (especially a long-lasting one). Rational speculators recognising that would be less 
willing to pay hefty interest rate spread to speculate against such currency. 
The switch from the ERM-2 to the currency union is likely to be close to the non-stochastic 
process switching environment. Thus a model describing the behaviour of the financial markets 
faced with a pre-announced currency peg in a clearly defined future should be of some use.  
Obstfeld and Stockman (1985) find out that announcement of a known peg on known date leads 
to immediate jump towards the new parity (relative to the original free-floating exchange rate path), 
and a smooth adjustment towards the pre-announced peg. 
Ichikawa et al. (1990) apply such a regime change arrangement to the well-known Krugman’s 
(1988) credible exchange rate band foreign exchange rate model. Their findings are also consistent 
with the Obsfeld and Stockman (1985): the announcement of the fully credible peg (exchange rate 
band of zero width) results in an immediate jump of the exchange rate towards the future peg (the 
jump is small if the regime change is distant enough). The exchange rate then depends less and 
less on the fundamentals (money supply and money’s velocity), and more on the exchange rate 
level set by the authorities. At time 0 (EMU entry) the exchange rate becomes totally insensitive to 
the underlying fundamentals. 
Djajić (1989) provides another model, based on the standard monetary model, in which the 
exchange  rate  path  ahead  of  the  fixing  at  the  known  date  depends  on  the  public  expectations 
concerning the length of the fixing period (it is expected to last forever in case of the EMU entry), 
and the desired level of foreign exchange reserves/domestic money after the fixing. 
The models are applicable to the situation of a fully credible announcement of both the level and 
the time of the regime switch, and this should indeed well describe the environment of the final 6  
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months of ERM-2 membership. While the timing of entry should be known relatively well in advance, 
the exchange rate would come slightly later.  
The inherent asymmetry of the final peg expectations may have some impact on the market 
exchange rate while in the ERM-2. The Krugman’s S-curve cannot stay symmetrical if fixing the 
exchange  rate  weaker  then  the  parity  cannot  be  expected.  Thus,  as  the  date  of  the  EMU 
approaches, the S-curve should be becoming much flatter on the weak side of the parity (exchange 
rate would be more and more insensitive to fundamentals because of appreciation expectations in 
the credible ERM-EMU switch). The change of the shape of the S-curve on the stronger side of the 
parity would depend on the political bargaining process, but given the experience of previous EMU 
entry cases, the benchmark case of ERM-2 parity becoming the final rate would suggest the curve 
gets flatter on that side as well. 
Figure 11. Exchange rate and fundamentals on the way from ERM-2 to EMU 
 
Budget deficit and public debt 
There are several channels through which the choice of the exchange rate regime influences 
the fiscal position of the government. 
First, the non-rigid exchange rate, in the CEEC reality, can stimulate nominal appreciation. This, 
in turn, hits profits (and tax intake from) the non-tradable sector. The effect of lost taxes depends on 
the productivity growth in the sector. Similarly, the non-tradable sector inflation (and thus nominal 
PIT and CIT in the sector) can be contained by nominal appreciation (relative prices in tradable-non-
tradable sector can change without wage and price increases). In the short-run this damages also 
VAT income. 
Generally, for counties which managed to deal with most forms of automatic inflation indexation 
(read countries that have recently been through a period of sub 5% CPI), a period of higher inflation 
does  facilitate  fiscal  consolidation.  Nominal  downward  rigidities  are  prevalent  in  labour  market 
regulations in most CEECs. Almost all taxes depend on nominal wages and prices, while some 
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output and fiscal balance can be achieved by surprise depreciation and inflation. This is out of the 
question within the ERM-2, but the accession country can set the more rigid exchange rate in order 
to get some inflation. Getting the balance right (improving the fiscal balance, but without overdoing it 
on  the  CPI  side,  which  could  breach  another  Maastricht  criterion)  is  tricky.  The  exchange  rate 
inflation and exchange rate-output pass-through factors differ among the countries, so the size of 
the effects would vary. 
Even though the inflation effect of the currency board or a peg need not to be much larger than 
for  a  currency  band  (because  of  relatively  small  likelihood  of  nominal  appreciation  becoming 
permanent through parity revaluation), the average exchange rate during the ERM-2 period is likely 
to be stronger for the band than for the peg9. 
Second channel through which exchange rate regime influences the budget deficit is debt servicing. 
As  argued  above,  floating  exchange  rate  can  have  a  two-fold  effect.  Expectations  of  nominal 
appreciation (as well as lower inflation) should keep the yields and debt servicing costs down. Despite 
non-zero probability of a revaluation, such expectations would be severely limited by the benchmark 
expectations of the return to the parity, as was the case for most of the current EMU members. On the 
other hand, short-term exchange rate risk can still influence a big part of the yield curve. 
Another, fourth, indirect influence of the exchange rate regime on budget deficit is related to the 
straightjacket of the fixed exchange rates. Advanced CEECs cannot resort to deficit monetisations. 
However, the perils of slack fiscal policy under fixed exchange rate or under the currency board are 
well known, and it appears are also well understood by the policymakers in the CEECs. Not a single 
fixed exchange rate accession country (including Bulgaria) had budget deficit above 3% of GDP in 
2002, while all others (apart from Slovenia and Romania) had. Even if hard economic arguments do 
not  fully  support  the  case  for  higher  budget  deficit  under  the  floating  exchange  rate  regime  (a 
possibility  of  nominal  appreciation  for  +/-15%  band  and  related  lower  debt  financing  costs,  but 
higher  short-term  currency  risk  widening  the  spreads,  and  making  currency  board  look  more 
attractive), lack of the straightjacket of the fixed exchange rate already does seem to make the non-
pegging CEECs less strict about their budgets. 
Public debt impact of the ERM-2 regime choice can be due to three channels. First is the budget 
deficit,  likely  to  be  smaller  under  more  rigid  exchange  rate  regimes,  and  especially  under  the 
currency board.  
Second is inflation, and its influence on nominal GDP, the denominator of the public debt ratio. 
Again, lower CPI which should be associated with the (properly aligned) wide ERM-2 band puts 
such countries in a disadvantaged position.  
The  third  is  the  exchange  rate  itself.  Nominal  appreciation  has  an  immediate  public  debt 
reducing impact, as the local currency value of the € debt falls. Such process, in turn, favours wide-
band ERM-2 members the most. The overall influence of the exchange rate regime depends on the 
currency  composition  of  the  public  debt.  For  example,  nominal  appreciation  would  certainly  be 
                                                  
9 Much depends on the parity set, but there is no reason to believe the parity would be weaker for the band  
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negative for Czech debt figures because Czech Republic does not have any foreign public debt. For 
Poland,  with  its  33%  of  foreign  currency  debt,  the  short-term  impact  of  appreciation  would  be 
positive. For countries with significant share of foreign currency debt, and ERM-2 membership short 
enough, the band is likely to be positive for meeting the public debt Maastricht criteria. Longer ERM-
2 membership favours pegging as a way to keep public debt levels in check. Indeed, the data 
seems to support it – floating exchange rate countries (as almost all of the CEECs) have low 36% of 
GDP public debt on average, but that is still 10 percentage points more than in the case of the 
pegging countries, including Bulgaria with its 65% of GDP (average public debt of the other three 
was a mere 14.7% of GDP). 
How to get there: from here to ERM-2 
This section describes three issues relating to the choice of the exchange rate regime choice 
ahead of the ERM-2 entry. Can a specific regime make it easier to meet Maastricht criteria later, 
within the ERM-2? Does the exchange rate regime matter for the dynamics of setting the exchange 
rate parity in the various versions of the ERM-2? Finally, we touch on the idea that the EMU entry 
could actually increase exchange rate volatility faced by some economic agents in a country; that 
could happen if the €/US$ exchange rate is more volatile than US$/local currency exchange rate 
prior to the EMU entry. 
Getting ready for the Maastricht 
The choice of the pre-ERM-2 exchange rate regime matter for just three Maatricht criteria. They 
are inflation, budget deficit, and public debt. Interest rates and exchange rate stability do not exhibit 
sufficient inertia to influence the ability to fulfil the criteria one year-ahead of the EMU. 
Inflation 
For advanced CEECs floating exchange rate should help make meeting the inflation close to the 
CPI target easier in the long run, which, given the CPI inertia should help in meeting the Maastricht 
criterion. 
Many countries seem to be unable to use other means of fighting very high inflation than a 
currency peg. The cases of Romania and Bulgaria are good examples. Romania remains with a 
(dirty) floating exchange rate and had 2002 CPI at 22.5%, the highest of all accession CEECs. 
Bulgaria, on the other hand, had the highest inflation of all pegging CEECs, but at 5.8% it looks 
decent  enough,  compared  with  2019.5%  in  March  199710.  Still,  performance  of  the  countries 
actually joining the EU in May 2004 suggests it is unlikely that peg will be the only inflation-credible 
exchange  rate  regime  by  the  time  of  the  EU  entry  for  Romania  and  Bulgaria.  Relative  price 
adjustment will thus be more of a problem than post-transformation price stabilisation. 
                                                  
10 To be fair, Romania had 164% YoY CPI in that period.  
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The ability of the policy-makers to use adjustable, but managed exchange rate as an inflation-
fighting  tool  was  not  used  because  of  the  competing  goal  to  support  external  competitiveness. 
Lower inflation-fighting credibility caused, on average over four percentage points higher inflation in 
managed, but not fixed exchange rate regimes. In the later stages, it is likely that the devaluation 
temptation, presumably higher in non-fixed managed regime countries than in currency boards, may 
boost inflationary expectations even more in such countries prior to the adoption of the ERM-2. 
What is the actual performance of the CEECs so far? It matches the indicated CPI performance 
relatively  well.  If  we  exclude  Bulgaria  and  Romania  from  the  calculations,  the  average  floating 
CEECs CPI in 2002 was 2.34, while for the pegging/currency board countries it was 1.92% YoY. 
Hungary and Slovenia with their intermediate regimes fared the worst of the advanced accession 
states with 6.4% inflation. Including the late-comers made the currency board and pegged exchange 
rate counties loose their lead to the floaters by 0.5 percentage points. Managed, but not pegged 
exchange rate countries fared worse yet with 11.8% average CPI in 2002. 
Budget deficit and public debt 
Due to nominal rigidities, it may be easier to reform public finances with higher inflation. This 
effect,  however,  is  likely  to  be  limited  for  post-transformation  economies,  with  indexation 
mechanisms still not completely removed. 
Speed of debt accumulation depends also on bond yields. Nominal appreciation expectations 
favour the floaters again. However, they suffer from higher short-term foreign exchange volatility. 
This factor may be even more important than the underlying long-term strengthening trend, which 
should be seen in low-inflation floating exchange rate CEECs.  
For longer bonds, the ones actually being instrumental for the convergence play (investments 
based on the presumption the interest rates converge into the core-EMU levels), another type of 
exchange risk is also crucial. It is the risk of up-front depreciation at the gate to ERM-2 – which is 
almost  the  last  chance  of  an  officially  sanctioned  devaluation  ever.  While  countries  with  all 
exchange rate regimes face the temptation to devalue, the differences still exist. It is hard to imagine 
current parities of the €-linked currency boards would be altered, which puts Estonia, Lithuania and 
Bulgaria  in  slightly  more  comfortable  positions.  Policymakers  of  other  exchange  rate  regime 
economies could attempt to use temporary weakness of the currency to establish the ERM-2 parity. 
One  could  argue  that,  in  the  early  stages  of  transition,  pegging  is  a  faster  way  of  fighting 
inflation. This could give floating exchanges and crawling pegs some fiscal advantage – higher initial 
inflation could wipe out the debt early on. The “clean start” argument is not really valid in case of 
most of the CEECs, as the amount of the local currency debt was usually very low to start with. The 
transition would have to last long enough for the local currency bond market to develop. But in such 
case, the inflation surprise would not be a surprise anymore; indeed Romanian 22.5% inflation is 
brings little comfort for the public debt, as 2-year yield is at 22%. 
The facts on bond yields are mixed. It appears that long bond yields have not converged more 
in floating exchange rate countries, than in the currency board ones. Even though the lowest spread  
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country  is  Czech  Republic  (where  yields  were,  at  some  stage,  trading  through  the  German 
equivalents), others’ yields, and inflation performance are not any better than that of the peggers. 
Probably the most important fiscal difference between currency regimes in the run-up to the 
ERM-2 is the recognised value of tight fiscal policy in very rigid exchange rate arrangements. Slack 
fiscal policy in such countries increases the problems with inflation and external competitiveness. It 
can also put doubt on the regime altogether. This forces the currency board and rigid peg countries 
to reform their finances, which subsequently makes it easier to meet the Maastricht criteria on debt 
and deficit. 
The regime switch 
From the float and managed float 
As  already  shown  above,  models  describing  the  transition  from  a  float  into  the  credible, 
predefined currency peg in known time (in case of fixed-exchange rate version of the ERM-2) point 
to the jump in exchange rate towards the peg, and slow loss of relationship between monetary 
fundamentals and the exchange rate. This is because the expectations component of the exchange 
rate determination becomes more important as the time of the switch approaches (which, in turn, 
arises from the monetary credibility of the peg).  
Ichikawa et al. (1992) show the dynamics of the conversion from a float to a perfectly credible 
currency band (similar to a change from, say, floating Czech crown exchange rate to the ERM-2). 
The analytical solution quickly becomes intractable, but the basic idea is similar to the one proved 
for the float to a fix.  The currency moves from a linear relationship between fundamentals and 
exchange rate, to a familiar S-shaped curve, at first only slightly bent, and in time 0 becoming fully 
contained within the exchange rate bands. 
The  size  of  the  jump  depends  on  how  far  in  advance  the  change  is  announced.  If  the 
policymakers fail to inform the markets well in advance about the exchange rate, they can be faced 
with significant jump in exchange rate (but not the interest rate). 
The announced peg, or band may not be credible for two reasons. Either the parity points to an 
overly strong local currency, or the parity is set too weak with relation to fundamentals or market 
conditions. Too strong exchange rate (relative to the floating rate), to be credible, requires major 
monetary tightening, leading to growth problems. Overall fiscal consequences would depend on the 
debt levels – primary deficit would be expected to rise (due to growth-related erosion of the tax 
base), while debt service costs would fall thanks to yields dropping on expectations of nominal 
appreciation. Too weak parity may prove to be unsustainable either because of the threat to the CPI 
targets or because of the quasi-fiscal costs related to the necessary money market sterilisation 
operations11.  
                                                  
11 The old argument about sterilised interventions being not effective in countries with fully opened capital account is 
important here. Taking this argument seriously, the sterilisation costs would be infinitely high, assuming local currency  
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In  order  to  avoid  monetary  policy  shocks,  while  targeting  specific  exchange  rate,  the 
policymakers  of  the  floating  CEECs  could  resort  to  state  contingency  of  the  regime  switch. 
According to Smith and Smith (1990), after the World War I, British policymakers wanted to (and 
were letting everyone know about it): 
·  Fix the pound to gold. 
·  Have the parity stronger than after-war exchange rate, preferably at the pre-war 
level. 
·  Leave some time until the exchange rate adjusts itself to the desired level, at which 
point the fixing occurs. 
The floating CEECs situation is not much different. In particular, the markets: 
·  Expect the government/central bank will fix the national currency to the euro 
·  Often believe that the government would like to see the local currency weaker than 
the average market rate  
·  See that the floating exchange rate regime creates a possibility to do it, provided 
the exchange rate swings towards a more desirable level (it can be fixed at that 
time, with no objectives from any other body) 
What are the implications of such regime-switching environment? Smith and Smith (1990) claim 
that in case of Britain it resulted in longer return in the gold standard and a weaker pound during the 
adjustment. They got this surprising result by assuming that the pound had an exogenous tendency 
to strengthen, which was expected to be counteracted on as soon as the pound reached the desired 
parity level. 
To illustrate, imagine, a set-up similar to Figure 9. F’F’ line is a free floating relationship between 
fundamentals and exchange rate, assuming expectations of a long-run nominal appreciation (e.g. 
due to relative price adjustments). FF is the free float relationship without such expectations – it 
points to a weaker exchange rate than F’F’ (the difference depends on expectations parameter, and 
the drift in fundamentals). If the authorities promise to fix the exchange rate as soon as it reaches 
the level s*, rational speculators must expect an end to the fundamental appreciation trend at that 
point. So, the fixing point must lie on FF line (from that point onwards no appreciation is expected. 
Thus, the intermediate regime must be between the two curves, as the appreciation expectations 
slowly give way to the fixing reality. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
short-term interest rates are higher than their foreign equivalent (portfolio balance arguments would ensure the capital 
inflow is not infinite)  
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The  conclusion  of  the  argument  is  that  the  known  government’s  wish  to  make  use  of  the 
appreciation trend to fix the parity at a stronger level leads to weaker than otherwise exchange rate 
in the run-up to the fixing.  
As Miller and Sutherland (1992) point out, there are two problems with application of such a 
paradox  to  Britain’s  return  to  gold  in  1925.  First,  the  claim  that  the  switch  was  not  at  all  time-
contingent is unjustified. Similarly, it can be claimed, that the CEECs would not be willing to wait 
forever for the exchange rate to reach the proper level. The timing of the switch could occur earlier if 
condition prove right, but still not later than a specific date (for example determined by the political 
cycle formula: election date – 2 years to allow for EMU entry before elections). Assuming money 
velocity does not follow any trend, and using the Krugman’s nomenclature (see Figure 9) the switch 
would look like in Figure 13. 
Figure 13. Time and state dependent regime switch 
 
The free float exchange rate (s) monetary shock (v) locus is shown as the 45 degree line FF. 
The  desired  exchange  rate  is  s-bar.  The  credible  announcement  of  the  fixing  within  some  time 
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v<v-bar (thick line). However, if v exceeds v-bar, the fixing occurs. This is where state-dependency 
kicks in. As time to the fixing date passes the expectations component starts to matter more, and 
the bold curve becomes more and more horizontal. 
Second  problem  is  the  fact  that  Smith  and  Smith  interpreted  the  monetary  aggregates  drift 
towards  stronger  pound  as  exogenous.  The  expectations  of  the  ending  of  the  trend  once  the 
exchange rate reaches the desired level could have weakened the spot rate. If the trend was in fact 
caused by British policymakers, the result would be completely opposite (as long as the pound is 
trading  weaker  than  the  desired  level,  the  authorities  will  continue  to  tighten).  Because  of  the 
fundamental nominal strengthening trend in CEECs case, the Smith and Smith model could only be 
applied for strong target exchange rates, where fixing prospects mean expectations of the end of 
the  underlying,  exogenous  trend.  More  likely  is  the  opposite  case,  where  the  desired  weaker 
exchange rate requires changes in policy. Then, the exchange rate would approach the desired 
(weaker)  level  earlier  than  in  the  free-floating  case  (which  could  never  happen,  given  the 
fundamentals). 
Froot and Rogoff (1991) argues that the known date of giving up the monetary authority creates 
expectations of currency weakness and widening of the interest rate spreads just ahead of the EMU 
accession date. Their idea is that after the transition the policymakers’ credibility is useless (national 
central banks have no monetary policy powers in the EMU anyway). Therefore the policymakers 
face a great temptation to (almost costlessly) wipe out their domestic-currency denominated debt, or 
(assuming  Keynesian  price  rigidities)  stimulate  the  economy  through  real  exchange  rate 
depreciation,  which  may  then  ease  the  burden  of  necessary  fiscal  reform.  The  policymaker 
optimises using the following loss function: 



























, , w b b , 
where  dt  and  dt
e  are  actual  and  expected  devaluations  in  period  t,  C  is  the  fixed  cost  of 
devaluing the exchange rate (eg. connected with negotiation costs with the EU Commission, hurt 
ego of the central bank governor, etc). The first of the three terms of the loss function represents the 
short-term  gain  from  unexpected  devaluation:  higher  ω  (0<ω<1)  means  higher  gain  from 
devaluation. The second (squared depreciation) is loss associated with depreciating currency in 
each period. Finally R is the fixed cost of reneging on the fixing. R becomes C if dt is greater than 
zero for any t. Cost C is assumed to be uniformly distributed between [0, µ], and is known by the 
policymaker only, but not the public (which knows only the upper limit µ). 
It is then rational for the public to attach ever-increasing probability of devaluation as the date of 
giving up monetary policy approaches (the costs of doing so go down over time, as the number of 
periods in which d
2 is paid falls). This makes the government pay higher inflation premium on the 
local-currency  denominated  debt.  This  may  mean  that  the  government  is  ultimately  forced  to 
devalue (as they actually were, one year after publication of the paper). Obstfeld’s (1996) second-
generation crisis model immediately comes to mind.  
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The set-up, and the idea that the EMU entry poses a strong temptation to inflate are far from 
purely theoretical. This is probably the idea behind the ERM-2 requirement of not devaluing. In the 
model it means that C becomes extremely high – the cost of devaluing prior to the EMU prevents 
from the EMU entry altogether. 
The cost of the ERM-2 entry depreciation, however, is likely to be less forbidding. This means 
that the final period of the process of ERM-2 accession may be characterised by rising interest rate 
spreads  and  that  shortening  of  the  period  of  accession  will  not  eliminate  the  effect.  What  the 
government can do about it? The key is to show the investors that C is very high; that devaluation is 
neither feasible nor desirable. The means to achieve it are: 
·  Convincing  the  public  that  EU  member  states  will  not  tolerate  competitive 
devaluation. While in case of the unilateral euroisation, EU institutions have very 
limited  influence  on  the  parity  rate;  both  normal  EMU  and  ERM-2  accession 
requires parity agreement of all the EMU member states, according to the Treaty of 
Maastricht, art. 123, para 5. Does this mean that up-front competitive devaluation is 
impossible?  Not  entirely,  the  politics  rule  all  such  decisions,  and  there  is  a 
possibility of the key EMU member states agreement in exchange for e.g. fishing 
rights, or CAP reform. 
·  Convincing  the  public  that  devaluation/depreciation  is  not  desired,  for  whatever 
reason.  While  it  is  not  easy,  given  the  model,  the  authorities  can  at  least  stop 
talking about the need for a weaker currency. It is simply costly. 
·  Fixing the currency for good. 
·  Indexing  the  debt  to  foreign  currency.  This  way,  devaluation  would  be 
counterproductive for reducing the public debt. Also, useful are binding debt level 
limits expressed as a percentage of GDP. Maastricht 60% limit, as well as Polish 
constitutional limit may make devaluation impossible, as it would influence not only 
numerator, but also denominator (nominal GDP level expressed in euro). Thus with 
only  10%  foreign  debt,  but  overall  debt  level  at  60%  of  GDP,  any  depreciation 
would require costly fiscal adjustment programme, even if inflation was to make up 
for the lost nominal GDP. 
Theoretical models of perfectly credible regime change announcement point to a gradual shift of 
the currency towards the new parity, with fundamentals loosing its importance as the critical day 
approaches.  The  situation  with  endogenous  parity  level,  or  endogenous  switch  time  is  more 
complicated, but it gives rise to interesting conclusions. First, the markets have reasons to expect 
the government to use the end-of-game argument to devalue and wipe out its domestic currency-
denominated debt. This could lead to an increase in bond yields  and weakening of the market 
exchange  rate  prior  to  the  parity  rate  announcement.  Second,  in  the  unlikely  case  of  CEEC 
policymakers known to set the parity stronger than market rate, and exogenous trend in exchange 
rate (caused e.g. by relative price adjustments), the convergence of the nominal rate to the desired 
level would be slowed down.  
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From fixed exchange rate 
In the CEEC environment facing fundamental real appreciation trend, pegged exchange rates 
and currency boards can normally last forever. The typical first-generation crisis model dynamics 
shows growth in domestic money offset by falls in reserves (money supply must be held constant in 
Flood and Garber 1984, as PPP and uncovered interest parity ensures prices and interest rates do 
not change, and neither does money demand while the exchange rate stays fixed). One way to 
describe  the  CEECs  situation  is  to  lift  the  PPP  condition,  adding  non-tradables’  prices,  which 
exogenously drift upwards. This ensures that nominal money demand grows together with overall 
price level, which, if domestic credit remains constant, boosts reserves in each period of the peg12. 
With the announcement of the float, money supply becomes constant, and changes in non-
tradable price level should translate into expected nominal appreciation and lower interest rates. 
The  change  depends  on  the  non-tradables’  inflation,  their  weight  in  consumer  price  index,  and 
interest  rate  elasticity  of  money  demand.  Sudden  switch  into  float  would  then  appreciate  the 
currency immediately.  
Announcement of the end of the peg some time ahead of the event would ensure no exchange 
rate jump. It would boost the money supply (through higher growth of foreign exchange reserves) to 
the point that the peg exchange rate is also a free float solution. This growth in money supply would 
ensure  interest  rates  temporarily  drop  ahead  of  the  end  of  the  peg  to  maintain  money  market 
equilibrium  amid  prices  responding  to  (still  pegged)  exchange  rate  and  constant  trend  in  non-
tradable prices. 
The transition to the currency band would depend on the parity chosen, and the results are 
shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15. Surprise switch into the currency band is equivalent to vertical 
jump from a point on the FF curve (where money demand increases are offset by reserve growth), 
to the S-shaped curve CC, based on free float F’F’ (where money demand increases are not offset 
by money supply changes), and expectations of monetary expansion/contraction at the edges of the 
band. For the currency band parity set at peg level, the step appreciation for immediate regime 
change would be smaller than for the switch to the float. The currency could appreciate even if the 
parity is set weaker than the peg. It would appreciate more than in the floating case if the parity is 
set much stronger than the peg (unlikely in the CEEC case). 
                                                  
12 Another option is to include GDP growth differential which increases real money demand   
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As in the floating case, prior announcement of the currency band (likely to happen in the ERM-2 
case),  would  imply  reserves  inflow,  and  temporary  interest  rate  fall  for  a  wide  range  of  parity 
options, and capital outflow for an extremely weak parity.  














A special case would occur if the peg were to be outside of the currency band. Setting the 
stronger edge of the band weaker than the peg would imply the commitment to print as much local 
currency as needed to get the currency within the band. Such possibility along with the peg still in 
place until the moment of the band introduction would require anticipated jump in exchange rate, 
providing infinite profits for speculators. Such thing should never happen in competitive and open 
financial markets. The mechanism of a too strong peg collapse is well known. If the peg remains too 
weak, the result could be infinite inflow of capital. 
The pre-announced entering into ERM-2 currency band from a pegged exchange rate can thus 
cause capital inflow and interest rate falls even if the parity is set weaker than the previously 
prevailing exchange rate. This effect would be stronger the stronger the interest semi-elasticity of 
money demand, and the stronger the fundamental (perceived) appreciation trend.  
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Forgetting the dollars 
Large foreign exchange volatility on G3 markets underscores a problem for some of the CEECs. 
EMU entry could actually increase exchange rate volatility faced by some economic agents in a 
country. That could happen if the €/US$ exchange rate is more volatile than US$/local currency 
exchange rate prior to the EMU entry. Below, we propose a method of measuring attachment of 
local exchange rate to key world currencies. As a result, we calculate an optimal basket, which 
minimises currency risk (while financing, or investing abroad). 
To derive the results, we analysed the daily profit and loss from long CEEC currency positions 
from 1999 through June 2003. Optimal basket 0<B<1 minimises the variance of 21 daily returns 
from buying 1m of local currency, paying US$ for b*1m and € for (1-B)*1m. The result shows the 
proportion  of  US$  and  €  the  investor  (or  local  firm  financing  itself  abroad),  should  choose  to 
minimise its risk to €/US$ rates. 
In a country which has the exchange rate pegged to the US$, €/US$ volatility translates one-to-
one to €/local currency changes. Lithuania used to be such a country, and not surprisingly, stopped 
being one as soon as the reference currency for the currency board was switched into €. In the case 
of managed and floating exchange rates, the exposure of the local currency to cross-exchange rate 
movements is much less obvious. Figure 16 shows such optimal currency baskets for the CEECs. 
Figure 16. Optimal currency baskets in CEEC countries 
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Bulgaria  Estonia 
   
Latvia    Romania 
   
Slovenia   Hungary 
 
 
Of  all  the  CEECs  analysed  above,  Romania,  Poland  and  Latvia  still  exhibit  significant 
attachment to the US dollar. The dollar’s weakness against the € in 2003 translated into larger 
PLN/€, LTV/€ and ROL/€ depreciation.  
The sources of large share of US$ in the optimal basket could include dependence on raw 
materials trade, large US$ debt, historical and cultural reasons, and exchange rate regime causes. 
The first two causes are fundamentally justified and could call for some caution in establishing very 
rigid exchange rate regime with respect to the euro. The other two can be quite safely ignored, 
being endogenous and dependent either on present, or on past currency regime13. 
                                                  
13 Yet, abrupt change in volatility patterns created for whatever reasons could cause some problems for the real 
economy, creating unexpected currency risk. For example, if a dollarised property market suddenly becomes euroised, 
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Lithuania’s and Hungary managed to reduce significant shares of US$ in their currency trading 
baskets to (close to) zero in less than a month. Lithuania did that by switching the currency board 
reference currency from US$ to €, while in Hungary, it was enough to change the composition of the 
currency basket from 30% US$ and 70% € (quite well reflected in actual trading, see figure above), 
to 100% €. This experience suggests that introduction of any form of ERM-2 could suffice to change 
the trading habits. 
Conclusions 
Assuming similar CPI levels at the beginning of the ERM-2 period, wide band should make it the 
easiest to meet the price stability criterion, followed by narrow-band arrangement, and pegs. 
Narrow-band  ERM-2  seems  to  be  the  most  problematic  in  terms of  exchange  rate  stability, 
followed wide-band ERM-2, and currency boards. This classification, however, is not as clear-cut as 
the price-stability one. Much depends on the ERM-2 parity level. 
Fixed  exchange  rate  arrangements  should  be  better  for  budget  deficit  criterion,  followed  by 
narrow and wide bands. Public debt statistics, however, could be aided by the nominal appreciation 
possibility, provided foreign debt is significant, and exchange rate-inflation pass through is not too 
fast. 
Current standing of the CEECs suggests that rigid exchange rate regimes, including pegs and 
currency boards, allow, by far, the fastest nominal convergence. Straightjacket over fiscal policy, 
and resulting smaller accumulation of public debt, and the obvious currency stability are undisputed. 
Bond  yields  are  not  systematically  higher  in  such  countries,  as  lack  of  nominal  appreciation  is 
compensated by lower short-term exchange rate risk. Finally, inflation, while theoretically suffering 
from the lack of nominal appreciation buffer, compensating the relative price adjustments, does not 
seem to be as big a problem so far: on average CPI has been very close to that of the floating 
exchange rate countries. 
Fixed exchange rate does not fully solve the problem of final parity speculations. However, 
especially the countries with €-linked currency boards are likely to avoid bond yields pick-up, and 
higher  fiscal  costs,  related  to  the  risk  of  the  final  parity  being  set  at  a  weaker  level  than  that 
prevailing during the pre-ERM-2 peg period. What is more, the unlikely switch from fix exchange 
rates into the target zone with weaker parity may still lead to nominal appreciation. 
The temptation to devalue for countries with other exchange rate regimes, will be mitigated by 
political pressures (the needed agreement of all member states for the final parity), fiscal costs of 
sterilised intervention defending the stronger edge of the band, potential CPI outcome of such a 
move, and short-term effect of foreign-currency denominated debt inflation, which could offset the 
reduction of the real value of local currency debt. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
fact that the value of the real estate is also quoted in US$ (sudden US$ strength increases also the local currency value of 
the property), becomes unhedged when house pricing switches to local currency or €.  
                                                                                 Studies & Analyses  No. 266 – Mateusz Szczurek 
37 
References 
Agénor, P.R., Jagdeep S. Bhandari, R. P. Flood (1992), Speculative Attacks and Models of Balance 
of Payments Crises, NBER WP No. 3919. 
Buiter, W., C. Grafe (2002), Anchor, float or abandon ship: Exchange rate regimes for the Accession 
countries, EIB Papers Volume 7, No 2, pp. 51-71. 
Coricelli,  F.  (2001),  Exchange  rate  arrangements  in  the  transition  to  EMU:  some  arguments  in 
favour of an early adoption of the euro, paper prepared for the NBP conference Polish Way to 
the Euro. 
Corsetti, G., P. Pesenti, N. Roubini (1999), Paper tigers? A model of the Asian crisis, European 
Economic Review 43, pp. 1211-1236. 
Csermely, A., B. Vonnak (2002),  The role of the exchange rate in the transmission mechanism in 
Hungary, paper presented at the ECB’s research meeting on Monetary Policy Transmission in 
the  Euro  Area  and  the  Accession  Countries,  National  Bank  of  Hungary,  September,  http:// 
english.mnb.hu/dokumentumok/ konf0209_csermely_vonnak.pdf 
Delgado, F. , B. Dumas (1992), Target zones, broad and narrow, [in:] P. Krugman, M. Miller (eds.),  
Exchange Rate Targets and Currency Bands, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Djajić, S. (1989), Dynamics of the exchange rate in anticipation of pegging, Journal of Internatinal 
Money and Finance 8, pp. 559-571. 
Drazen, A. (1999), Political Contagion in Currency Crises,  NBER Working Paper No. 7202. 
Eichengreen,  B.,  A.  K.  Rose,  Ch.  Wyplosz  (1996),  Contagious  Currency  Crises:  First  Tests, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, No. 4, pp. 463-484. 
Flood, R., P. Garber (1984), Collapsing exchange rate regimes: some linear examples, Journal of 
International Economics 17, pp. 1-13. 
Flood, R. ,  P. Garber (1992), The linkage between speculative attack and target zone models of 
exchange rates: some extended results, [in:] Paul Krugman and Marcus Miller (eds.), Exchange 
Rate Targets and Currency Bands, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Flood, R. P., P. M. Garber (1983), A model of stochastic process switching, Econometrica 51, pp. 
537-551. 
Froot, K. A., K. Rogoff (1991), The EMS, the EMU, and the transition to a common currency, NBER 
WP No. 3684. 
Habib, M. (2002), Financial contagion, interest rates and the role of the exchange rate as a shock 
absorber  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  Discussion  Paper  No.  7,  pp.  42,  Bank  of  Finland 
Institute for Economies in Transition, BOFIT. 
Hotelling, H. (1931), The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, Journal of Political Economy, 39, 
pp. 137-25. 
Ichikawa, M. , M. Miller, A. Sutherland (1990), Entering a preannounced currency band, Economics 
Letters 34, pp. 363-368.  
                           Studies & Analyses No. 266 – Exchange rate regimes and the nominal convergence 
38 
Krugman, P. (1979), A model of balance of payments crises, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 
11, pp. 311-325. 
Krugman,  P.  (1988),  Target  Zones  and  exchange  rate  dynamics,  The  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics, No. 106 (August), pp. 669-82 
Krugman, P., J. Rotemberg (1992), Speculative attacks on target zones, [in:] P. Krugman and M.  
Miller  (eds.),  Exchange  Rate  Targets  and  Currency  Bands,  Cambridge  University  Press, 
Cambridge. 
Miller, M.,  A. Sutherland (1992), Britain’s return to gold and entry into the EMS: joining conditions 
and credibility, in P. Krugman, M. Miller (eds.),  Exchange Rate Targets and Currency Bands, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Obstfeld, M. (1994), The Logic of Currency Crises,  Cahiers Économiques et monétaires, No. 43, p. 
189, Banque de France. 
Obstfeld,  M.  (1996),  Models  of  currency  crises  with  self-fulfilling  features,  European  Economic 
Review 40, pp. 1037-1047. 
Obstfeld, M. (1984), Balance-of-Payments Crises and Devaluation, Journal of Money, Credit, and 
Banking, 16, pp. 208-217. 
Obstfeld, M., A. C. Stockman (1985), Exchange-Rate Dynamics, [in:] P.B. Kenen,  R.W. Jones, eds, 
Handbook of International Economics, Vol 2, Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Ozkan, F. Gulcin,  A. Sutherland (1998), A currency crisis model with an optimising policymaker, 
Journal of International Economics, 44, pp. 339-364. 
Pelkmans, J., Gros, D., N.  Ferrer, J. (2000),  Long Run Economic Aspects of the European Union’s 
Eastern Enlargement,  Scientific Council for Government Policy, WRR, Working Paper (109). 
Robertson, Ch., (2003), Solbes and the ERM criterion – just wait for the fudge, 21 May 2003 ING 
Emerging Markets Daily. 
Rodrik, D.,  A. Velasco (1999), Short Term Capital Flows, NBER WP No. 7364. 
Smith,  G.  W.  and  T.  Smith  (1990),  Stochastic  process  switching  and  the  return  to  gold,  1925, 
Economic Journal 100, pp. 164-175 
Velasco, A. (1996), Fixed exchange rates: Credibility, flexibility and multiplicity, European Economic 
Review, 40, pp. 1023-1035. 